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The Wyoming Natural Gas Consumers' Act
of 1985: An Experiment in Controlling
Natural Gas Prices and a Response
to Indefinite Price Escalation Clauses
Dee Pridgen*
Edward W. Harris**
In the 1985 session of the Wyoming legislature,a uniquepiece
of legislation was passed which allows cities in Wyoming to
negotiate their own naturalgas purchasingcontracts and to require the gas utility serving the city to transportthatgas. In this
article, the authors discuss the history and purpose of the Act as
well as its possible future. Laramie and Casperare alreadyattempting to utilize this innovative legislation, but, as the authorspoint
out, some problems may have to be addressed before the law can
be truly effective.
In 1985, the Wyoming legislature enacted a unique piece of legislation dealing with natural gas utilities. Under the "Natural Gas Consumers'
Act,"' any city or town in Wyoming can purchase natural gas directly
from suppliers, and can then require the local gas utility company to
distribute this gas to the consumers.2 The Act also prohibits the use of
indefinite price escalation clauses in natural gas contracts between Wyoming producers and buyers that resell to retail customers if the escalation clause would raise the contract price higher than the prevailing market
3
price of natural gas.
*Dee Pridgen, Professor of Law, University of Wyoming College of Law. J.D. 1974, New
York University; B.A., 1971, Cornell University.
**Edward H. Harris, Associate, Holland & Hart, Denver, Colorado. J.D. 1985, University
of Wyoming College of Law; B.A. 1979, Harvard University.
1. The legislature did not name the legislation, but the authors will refer to it as the
"Natural Gas Consumers' Act" for a convenient reference.
2. Enrolled Act 70, ch. 172, 1985 Wyo. Sess. Laws § 1.
3. WYO. STAT. § 15-1-103(c)(iii) (Supp. 1985).
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The first part of the Act separates two previously united functions
of natural gas utility companies. Before, natural gas utilities both purchased the gas and distributed it to consumers.' Under the new legislation, a municipality can purchase the gas on behalf of consumers. A utility company could be required, by the terms of its franchise, to transport
this gas from the suppliers and deliver it to consumers. The second part
of the Act simply prohibits the use of a particular type of contract clause
that many felt was forcing residential users to pay above market prices
for natural gas.
The basic motivation for the Wyoming Act-frustration over high gas
prices-is easy to understand. The reasons for the high prices are complex, however. Therefore, this article will first examine the underlying
causes of the problem addressed by the legislation. In the early 1970's,
in Wyoming as in other states, it became popular to insert indefinite price
escalation clauses into the private contracts between gas producers and
public utilities. The clauses allowed utility companies to secure long-term
supplies of natural gas, while protecting producers from locking into below
market prices over long periods of time. Due to unforeseen changes in
regulatory policy, the price escalation clauses ultimately required the payment of gas prices apparently well over current market prices. After a
major public utility operating in Wyoming failed in its attempt to have
such a clause judicially overturned as unconscionable, the legislature came
to the rescue with the 1985 Act.
This article will also analyze the Act itself. The legislation finally
passed is quite different from the original bill, and the changes clearly
demonstrate how the Act attempts to protect residential consumers from
paying more than necessary for natural gas. The legislative debate and
the comments and criticisms of several legislators buttress this conclusion.
The third part of this article will consider the future of the Wyoming
Natural Gas Consumers' Act. Because this legislation is unique, there are
no examples to guide the Wyoming experiment. The Wyoming legislation
may bring down natural gas prices for the consumers, or it may prove
to be a noble but misguided mistake.
BACKGROUND: THE NORTHERN CONTRACTS-A CASE STUDY
IN HIGH NATURAL GAS PRICES

Frustration over high natural gas prices was the basic motivation for
the Natural Gas Consumers' Act. A sponsor of the new legislation, Senator
Charles Scott from Casper, explained his support for the bill this way:
"We consider it an insult to be living in the middle of the gas patch and
paying higher than the market price." 5
Wyoming is a gas producing state. In 1982, for example, gas production in Wyoming was over 465 million MCF, and in 1983 gas production
4. See Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Northern Utilities, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 624 (D. Wyo. 1980).
5. Natural Gas Bill Opposed, Laramie Boomerang, February 9, 1985, at 1, Col. 4.
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in Wyoming probably topped 500 million MCF. 6 Yet consumers of natural
gas in Wyoming pay some of the highest prices in the nation for their
natural gas. In Laramie, for example, an average monthly gas bill is about
$52.00. This compares to an average monthly bill of $36.79 in Denver,
Colorado.7 A case study of one utility company's supply contracts will
help explain the commercial and regulatory background for the high price
of natural gas in Wyoming.
The Contracts
Northern Utilities, Inc. supplies natural gas to the cities of Casper,
Lander, Riverton, and intermediate communities. Northern Gas Company,
a separate corporation, is the natural gas utility for Laramie, Rawlins,
and intermediate communities. A large portion of the natural gas distributed by these two companies (referred to collectively hereafter as "Northern") is purchased under long term contracts from producers in the Beaver
Creek Field in Fremont County, Wyoming. In 1980, Northern litigated
these long term contracts, and the suit revealed many things about the
price of natural gas to Wyoming consumers
The original contracts between Northern and the three producers in
the Beaver Creek field9 were identical twenty year contracts entered into
during 1957 and 1958. In 1970 and 1973, these contracts were renegotiated
and amended, and were extended to the year 1990.10 These early 1970's
amendments to the natural gas purchase contracts were the immediate
subject of the litigation.
The original contracts each contained a two party most favored nations clause," which provided that the price paid to the producers would
increase to match any higher price Northern paid to any other gas producer in the state of Wyoming. The text of that clause read:
If, at any time during the term of this agreement, Northern pays
a producer of gas in the State of Wyoming a price per one thousand (1,000) cubic feet that is higher than the price being paid or
otherwise payable under this contract, due consideration being
given to the quality of the gas, bases of measurement and condi6. 7 STATE OF WYOMING ANNUAL REPORT, OIL AND GAS COMMISSION 5 (1983).
7. Laramie Gas Bills Higher Than Most Other Cities, Laramie Boomerang, April 24,
1985, at 1, col. 4.
8. Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Northern Utilities Corp., 500 F. Supp. 624 (D. Wyo. 1980),
rev'd, 673 F.2d 323 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 989 (1982). (Hereafter referred
to as Northern)The district court opinion was noted in Comment, 17 LAND & WATER L. REV.
257 (1982).
9. The three producers are Amoco Production Company, Kerr-McGee Corporation and
Phillips Petroleum Company.
10. Northern, 500 F. Supp. at 627.
11. The term "most favored nations clause" is taken from international law, where it
refers to a trade agreement under which the terms extended by one nation to another are
agreed to remain as favorable as the terms extended to the most favored nation with which
it deals. Gregg, Negotiating and Drafting Gas Purchase Contracts on Behalf of the Seller,
S.W. LEGAL FOUND. THIRTEENTH ANN. INST. ON OIL & GAS L. AND TAXATION 133 (1962).
Most favored nations clauses are one type of indefinite price escalation clause.
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tions of sale, Northern shall, commencing on the date of delivery
of such gas at such higher price, and continuing so long as such
price is in excess of the price otherwise payable under this contract, increase the price being paid or otherwise payable to [the
Beaver Creek producers] hereunder to equal such higher price. It
is the intention hereof that the price to be paid [the Beaver Creek
producers] hereunder shall at all times be equal to the higher of
the following: (a) the price payable under ... this contract ... ,
or (b) the highest price paid
by Northern to a producer of gas in
2
the State of Wyoming.
This sort of clause is common in natural gas contracts, 3 perhaps as
a direct result of government regulation.14 The federal government requires
pipelines to show adequate long-term commitments of gas in order to
receive the necessary certificate of public convenience and necessity.'"
Similarly, the Wyoming Public Service Commission requires a utility to
show it has adequate supplies of natural gas as part of its application for
the certificate of public convenience and necessity.16 Utilities and pipelines
must therefore enter into long term contracts with their suppliers, but
the suppliers are naturally reluctant to fix firm prices for natural gas over
such long periods. Producers enter these long term contracts only if the
agreements contain provisions to protect them if prices rise over the term
of the contract.
In the early 1970's, the contracts between Northern and the Beaver
Creek producers were renegotiated and amended. This time, in addition
to the common two party most favored nations clause, the contracts each
contained a third party most favored nations clause. This provision read:
From and after January 1, 1976, when the price to be paid by
Northern to [the Beaver Creek producers] pursuant to the other
provisions hereof is less than the sum of the price received for gas
being sold in interstate commerce, by any producer within the
State of Wyoming, except in the counties of Uinta and Lincoln,
plus three cents per one thousand cubic feet. . ., then Northern
shall increase the price to be paid [the Beaver Creek producers]
hereunder to a price equal to the price being received by such producer plus three cents per Mcf.' 7
This sort of indefinite price escalation clause is not common, but
neither was it unique to the Northern contracts. It effectively guaranteed
that Northern would pay more, by three cents per thousand cubic feet,
than the highest price paid for any gas sold in interstate commerce almost
anywhere in Wyoming. Furthermore, this third party most favored na12. Northern, 673 F.2d at 324, n.2.
13. See 4 WILLIAMS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 726 (1984 Supp.)
14. Payne, The Exemption of Producersfrom Regulation Act, 1956 A.B.A. SEC. MIN.
L. 40.
15. In re Kansas Pipe Line Co., 2 F.P.C. 29, 35-36 (1939).
16. WYo. STAT. § 37-3-112 (1977).
17. Northern, 500 F. Supp. at 628.
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tions clause, unlike its predecessor two party most favored nations clause,
did not even make allowances for different qualities, pressures, or other
attributes of the gas."8
By 1980, when Northern took the contract to court, the actual effect
of this provision was clear. Under the third party most favored nations
clause, the price Northern paid the Beaver Creek producers for natural
gas had increased from 28 cents per thousand cubic feet in 1976 to $2.80
per thousand cubic feet in 1980-a ten fold increase in four years. In contrast, the average wellhead price for natural gas in the United States in
1980 was $1.60 per thousand cubic feet.' 9 The court noted that this increase in price had "the effect of increasing the residential consumers'
$30 per month to a figure of approxmonthly gas bill from an assumed
20
imately $250 per month.

The Litigation
Northern's attempt to rid itself of the burden of the price escalation
clause through a court challenge ultimately proved unsuccessful. It won
a resounding victory in the district court, but the decision was reversed
by the Tenth Circuit.
In the Wyoming District Court, Judge Brimmer boldly declared the
third party most favored nations clause to be against public policy and
unconscionable. The court stated that parties should generally be able to
make and enforce their own agreements, but also concluded that a "court
should not hesitate to refrain from enforcing a contract provision when
there is some overriding reason for public concern and the contract provision in some way causes real harm to the public."' 2 Because Northern

was a utility company providing a vital product to the public, Judge Brimmer found that the contract involved a substantial public interest, justifying close judicial scrutiny of the terms of the contract.
Judge Brimmer found that the third party most favored nations clause
was contrary to the public policy of both the federal government and the
state of Wyoming. He concluded that the provision was intended by the
producers to "remove all price restraints from the contract and fix a then
indefinite price that would result in windfalls to the producers and would
result in unjustly burdensome and harsh results to the consumers.... ''22
The court not only refused to enforce the provision, it also ordered the
Beaver Creek producers to refund the amounts Northern had paid in
18. Id at 634.
19. 2 ENERGY INFORMATION AD., 1981 ANNUAL REPORT 115 (1982).
20. Northern, 500 F. Supp. at 634.
21. Id at 635. The unconscionability analysis of the district court opinion is criticized
in Comment, supra note 8, at 264-71.
22. Id See also Judge Barrett's concurring opinion in Superior Oil Co. v. Western Slope
Gas Co., 604 F.2d 1281, 1294-97 (10th Cir. 1979) (arguing that a two party most favored
nations clause is contrary to public policy.) But see Amoco Production Co. v. Kansas Power
& Light, 505 F. Supp. 628, 636-40 (D. Kan. 1981) (rejecting the argument of Kansas public
utility that a price escalation clause tied to FPC price ceilings was unconscionable).
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excess of the price calculated under the other provisions of the contract,
so that Northern could make refunds to its rate payers."
Unfortunately for Northern's rate payers, the Tenth Circuit reversed
the lower court's decision. The appeals court concluded that "the rise in
gas prices borne by the consumer as the result of this contract, which the
trial court found so disturbing, is not contrary to either federal or Wyoming public policy, nor is it the result of unconscionability,"
and said that
24
the contract should be enforced as written.
The Tenth Circuit based its finding largely on the Wyoming case of
In re Estate of Frederick.2 5 The court stated that, under Wyoming law,
"unconscionability is tested as of the time the agreement is made and not
in accordance with hindsight.' '26
Applying this perspective, the appellate court agreed with Judge Brimmer that the price increases under the contract were severe, but said that
price increase alone did not make a contract unconscionable. Both Northern and the Beaver Creek producers were experienced negotiators, well
versed in the details of the natural gas market. Unconscionability, by contrast, stems from such factors as "gross inequality of bargaining power,"
lack of an "opportunity for meaningful negotiation," or deprivation of
meaningful choice. Because the contract at issue did not seem completely unreasonable under the circumstances at the time it was agreed upon,
27
the court reversed Judge Brimmer's finding of unconscionability.
The Tenth Circuit's holding meant that Northern was forced to pay
an unusually high price for its natural gas. Being a regulated public utility, Northern was entitled as a matter of law to pass the high cost of this
gas on to consumers.2 8 Consumers of natural gas in Wyoming ended up
paying an extremely high price for their gas. In fact, because this contract set the price Northern paid for gas at three cents per thousand cubic
feet higher than any Wyoming gas sold in interstate commerce, Wyoming
consumers were forced to buy natural gas produced in their own state
at a higher price than any out-of-state consumer would have to pay.
The Difficulties of a Small, IntrastatePurchaser
One may wonder why Northern would have entered into a contract
that ultimately forced it to pay above market prices for the natural gas
23. Northern, 500 F. Supp. at 636.
24. Northern, 673 F.2d at 330.
25. 599 P.2d 550 (Wyo. 1979).
26. Northern, 673 F.2d at 328.
27. Id at 330. Some alternative legal theories that Northern might have employed to
relieve itself of the burden of the indefinite price escalation clause include: (1) a claim of commercial impracticability under Section 2-615 of the Uniform Commercial Code. See Tannenbaum, Commercial Impracticability under the Uniform Commercial Code: Natural Gas
Distributors' Vehicle for Excusing Long-Term Requirements Contracts?, 20 Hous. L. REV.
771 (1983); or (2) a claim that the contract should have been voided or reformed under the
common law doctrine of mutual mistake. See Aluminum Co. of America v. Essex Group,
Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53 (W.D. Pa. 1980).
28. Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas, 320 U.S. 591, 603 (1944).
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essential to its operations. First and most obviously, the 1970 amendments
to Northern's contracts were negotiated in the midst of a gas shortage.
Northern was dealing in a sellers' market, and had to accept almost any
terms available.
In its decision enforcing the Northern contract, the Tenth Circuit
noted several of the problems facing a small purchaser of intrastate natural
gas. Ironically, the court found most of these factors in Northern's own
letters and memoranda, and in statements Northern made to the Wyoming Public Service Commission when seeking PSC approval of the
contract.2 9 Judge Brimmer had concluded that Northern had been in a
disadvantaged bargaining position when it agreed to the third party most
favored nations clause. The Tenth Circuit, however, believed that the problems facing a small, intrastate purchaser did not show that Northern was
vulnerable to overreaching. Rather, the court felt that even a company
in an equal bargaining position with the producers could have willingly
agreed to such a contract under the circumstances.
First, of course, Northern had to enter into long term supply contracts
in order to have adequate supplies for its consumers. The Wyoming
Supreme Court has noted that producers are unlikely to enter into long
term contracts unless the buyer agrees to a most favored nations provision which maintains prices more favorable to the producer over the life
of the contract.3 0 It was, therefore, almost inevitable that Northern would
have to accept some sort of most favored nations clause in its contract
with the Beaver Creek producers.
Second, Northern stated that the high national demand for natural
gas had resulted in various large interstate pipelines becoming "very com3
petitive" for Wyoming's supply of natural gas. 1 Although the federal
government had set a ceiling on the prices which could be paid for natural
gas in interstate commerce, the interstate pipelines found other ways to
compensate Wyoming producers for selling the scarce supply of natural
gas to them. For example, the pipeline companies were participating in
drilling and exploration costs, making payments in advance for future gas
deliveries, and making interest free loans to the producers. The pipelines
were also agreeing to accept gas at the wellhead by installing and operating
all the gathering, dehydrating, and compression facilities. Finally, the large
volume pipelines could agree to take substantial amounts of gas in the
in order to provide the producers with a fast
early years of the contract
32
investment.
on
return
Since large interstate pipelines could offer these compensations, a
small buyer like Northern found it hard to secure the supplies it needed.
As Northern stated to the Wyoming Public Service Commission, "[iut is
very difficult for an intra-state gas distribution company, with a relative29. Northern, 673 F.2d at 329.
30. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Stauffer Chemical Co., 612 P.2d 463 (Wyo. 1980).

31. Northern, 673 F.2d at 329, n.11 (quoting statements made by Northern Utilities
Co. to the Wyoming PSC).
32. Id.
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ly limited market and high peak demands and a low load factor, to compete against these interstate companies and negotiate any long term gas
supply contracts."33 To obtain the supplies it needed, Northern was forced
to accept almost any terms the producers cared to extract.
Finally, in the early 1970's when Northern was renegotiating the contracts with the Beaver Creek producers, the needs of these sellers and the
buyer did not exactly meet. The producers found themselves with a large
reservoir of gas, but they hoped to produce and sell it quickly. Northern,
on the other hand, needed a steady supply over a several year period.1
In any effort to compromise, Northern was at a great disadvantage
because it had already-laid the pipelines into the Beaver Creek area and
could not afford to abandon that large investment. To achieve the sort
of compromise it needed and get the producers to agree to a more steady
production schedule, Northern was forced to accept the third party most
favored nations clause in the contract. In its statement to the Wyoming
PSC, Northern stated that the negotiations on this contract were long
and hard, and implied that this contract was about the best deal it could
35

get.

The Regulatory Environment
A combination of unforseen changes in the regulatory environment
contributed to Northern's plight. At the time the third party most favored
nations clause was accepted by Northern, federal price ceilings applied
only to gas sold in interstate commerce, not to gas sold in intrastate
commerce.3 6 One effect of this regulatory dichotomy was that Northern,
an intrastate buyer, could expect to pay somewhat more for its natural
gas supplies than an interstate purchaser. Thus, when Northern agreed
to pay a price at least as high as the price of any interstate gas sold by
Wyoming producers, it did so at a time when interstate gas was selling
for less than the intrastate gas it was purchasing. In a sharp departure
from the past approach to price regulation, first the Federal Power Commission (FPC) and then the 1978 Natural Gas Policy Act (NGPA) attempted to encourage new gas drilling by dramatically lifting the price ceilings
for newly drilled gas. The higher prices for some categories of interstate
gas then triggered the price escalation clause in Northern's contract to
unforeseen levels. A brief overview of federal price regulation of natural
gas should help explain the dilemma facing utilities like Northern.
The Federal Power Commission did not begin regulating the wellhead
prices of natural gas under the Natural Gas Act of 193837 until after the
Supreme Court's 1954 decision in Phillips Petroleum.38 Even then, the
33. Id.
34. Id.

35. Id
36. The Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 extended the price-setting power of the Federal

Energy Regulatory Commission (the successor to the Federal Power Commission) to cover
both interstate and intrastate sales. 15 U.S.C. § 3315 (1980).

37. Natural Gas Act, 52 Stat. 821 (1938) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-717w (1981)).

38. 342 U.S. 672 (1954).
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federal government regulated only the prices of gas sold in interstate commerce, and the prices of gas sold in intrastate commerce remained
unregulated.
By 1970, the FPC ceilings for gas prices in interstate commerce were
below the level that would have been set by market demand,9 creating a
shortage and causing prices in the intrastate market to surge. One United
States House of Representatives report, for example, said,
During the period 1969-1975, interstate natural gas prices for new
contracts rose by 158 percent, from approximately 19.8 [cents] per
Mcf to over 51 [cents] per Mcf. However, during the same period,
intrastate natural gas prices rose at an even greater rate, from
to in excess of $1.35
approximately 18.0 [cents] per Mcf in 1969
0
increase.
per Mcf in 1975, a 650 percent
Northern, which was engaged solely in intrastate commerce, naturally had
to pay the higher intrastate gas prices, and in 1970 at least, it could have
expected intrastate prices to stay above interstate prices.
Federal regulation of natural gas prices has undergone several changes
over the years. The FPC first established natural gas prices by considering the production costs of each individual producer. In 1944, the United
this method in FederalPower ComStates Supreme Court approved of
4' Setting prices on an individual firm
mission v. Hope Natural Gas Co.
FPC took a
basis proved far too cumbersome, however, and in 1960 the
42 the Supreme
Cases,
Rate
Area
Basin
Permian
the
In
different approach.
Court affirmed the FPC's plan to set natural gas prices by regions, and
also approved the FPC plan to set different prices for natural gas based
on the age of the well. The purpose of the two-tier approach was to encourage new drilling by allowing a higher price for gas pumped from new
wells, while preventing producers pumping from old wells with lower costs
from collecting the windfall profits or economic rents they would have
had they been able to charge up to the marginal cost of the new
received
43
wells.

Given this background, Northern should have expected the FPC to
set vintaged prices for the Rocky Mountain area. But the Supreme Court
in the PermianBasin case had only approved a two tier vintaged system,
for "old" and "new" gas. Northern could not have expected the multilayered vintage prices which the FPC and the NGPA eventually set for
the area.
Furthermore, during the time Northern was renegotiating its contracts
with the Beaver Creek producers, the FPC had wavered in its regulatory
approach. In 1972, the FPC abandoned the concepts of area pricing and
39. See Breyer & MacAvoy, The Natural Gas Shortage and the Regulation of Natural
Gas Producers, 86 HARV. L. REV. 941, 976-79 (1973).
40. H.R. REP. No. 732, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1976).
41. 320 U.9. 591 (1944).
42. 390 U.S. 747 (1968).
43. S. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM, 240-60 (1982).
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vintaging," adopting instead a uniform national price ceiling for natural
gas.4 5 Again, the courts approved the new scheme.4,
Thus, when Northern
was renegotiating its natural gas contracts in the
early 1970's, it may have
anticipated that the FPC would, at least for the next
several years, maintain a uniform national ceiling on gas sold in interstate
commerce.
The FPC, however, quickly changed course. In 1976,
the agency again
adopted a vintaging approach. This time, the agency
set
vintaged nationwide prices.' 7 By the time of the litigation between
Northern and the
Beaver Creek producers, the FPC had set national
price ceilings for at
least four vintages of gas, and the Natural Gas Policy
Act set some thirty different categories of gas for pricing purposes.48
When Northern took its contract to court, the maximum
legal price
for the Beaver Creek gas, had it been sold in interstate
commerce,
would
have been .295 cents per thousand cubic feet, 49 because
the Beaver Creek
gas was from wells commenced before January 1,
1973.50 In contrast, gas
from wells commenced on January 1, 1975, or
later could be sold in interstate commerce for around $1.60 per thousand
cubic feet.5 '
The third party most favored nations clause set Northern's
price three
cents higher than the price paid for any Wyoming
gas sold in interstate
commerce. Thus, the price Northern had to pay
was three cents higher
than the FPC's newest gas price, or about $1.63
per thousand cubic feet.
Furthermore, the FPC price ceiling for new gas
escalated every quarter
by one cent per thousand cubic feet.5"
A second feature of federal price regulation in Wyoming
was a special
rate for small producers. Beginning in 1975, the
FPC allowed small producers to charge 130% of the applicable price ceiling
established for large
producers.2 The FPC intended by this regulation
to recognize the additional costs experienced by small producers and
to encourage the drilling
of exploratory wells and the development of new
supplies of natural gas.5'
The producers in the Beaver Creek Field, Amoco
Production Company,
Kerr-McGee Corporation, and Phillips Petroleum
Company, were hardly
small producers. But because Northern's contract
price was to be three
cents higher than the highest price paid for any
interstate natural gas
44. FPC Opinion No. 639, 48 F.P.C. 1299 (1972).
See also Shell Oil Co. v. Federal Power
Comm'n, 491 F.2d 82, 84 (5th Cir. 1974).
45. FPC Opinion No. 699, 51 F.P.C. 2212 (1974).
46. Shell Oil Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 520 F.2d
1061 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
426 U.S. 941 (1976).
47. FPC Opinion No. 770, 56 F.P.C. 509 (1976); FPC
(1976) See also American Public Gas Ass'n v. Federal Opinion No. 770-A, 56 F.P.C. 2698
Power Comm'n, 567 F.2d 1016 (5th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 907 (1972).
48. See Pierce, Natural Gas Regulation, Deregulation
and Contracts, 68 VA. L. REV.
63, 87 (1982).
49. FPC Opinion No. 770-A, 56 F.P.C 2698 (1976).
50. Northern, 500 F. Supp. at 630.
51. FPC Opinion No. 770-A, 56 F.P.C. 2698 (1976).
52. Id.
53. FPC Opinion No. 742, 54 F.P.C. 853 (1975).
54. Id.
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in Wyoming, Northern was once again forced to pay the higher price.
Northern had to pay, not merely the $1.60 applicable to new natural gas,
but the small producers' rate of 130% of $1.60, with another three cents
premium, for a total of about $2.11 per thousand cubic feet.
The passage of the Natural Gas Policy Act in 1978 added to Northern's
problems."s Under this legislation, the regulated prices of new natural gas
would rise steadily until, in 1985, the price for new gas would be
deregulated. Thus, by 1980 when the contract was litigated, Northern
looked forward to even more uncertainty than before. At least with
regulated prices there was some predictability, but with unregulated prices
Northern could only speculate about what price some Wyoming company
might extract for a bit of natural gas. One thing was certain, however.
Whatever the highest price paid for natural gas in Wyoming, Northern
could expect to better that price by three cents per thousand cubic feet.
Contrary to any reasonable expectation on the part of Northern, the
price escalation clause forced it to pay the producers more for their gas
than they would have received had they sold it in interstate commerce
and more than the market price would have been in a totally deregulated
marketplace. FPC pricing regulations would have forced the Beaver Creek
producers to sell their gas in interstate commerce for only .295 cents per
thousand cubic feet. Northern was paying, at the time of the litigation,
around $2.80 per thousand cubic feet. In contrast, the average United
States price for natural gas at the wellhead in 1980 was only $1.60 per
56
thousand cubic feet.
Under normal competitive conditions, of course, no one would be willing to pay more than the going rate for a commodity. There is only one
market price for an item in equilibrium in a perfectly competitive market.
But the price ceilings had caused a shortage so that not all the demand
was being met, and gas had to be rationed. Thus, many buyers were willing to pay more than the average (regulated) price because that price was
lower than the price that would have been set by the unrestrained forces
of supply and demand.
Yet with the phase-in of deregulation mandated by the NGPA, the
higher deregulated prices which trigger the third party most favored nations clause would seem simply to reflect the actual market price for gas.
Under most circumstances there is nothing objectionable about forcing
a buyer, even a regulated public utility, to pay the market price, which
.after all reflects the true cost to society of using up that resource.
The
problem lies in the fact that the NGPA retains price ceilings for low priced
"old" gas. Thus, some pipelines will still be willing, even after deregulation, to purchase some portion of their gas needs at above market prices
because they can "cushion" those costs by averaging them with the cost
55. Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3432 (1981).
56. 2 ENERGY INFORMATION AD., supra note 19, at 115.
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of their low price "old" gas supplies. 57 If even one buyer in Wyoming pays
a price well above what would normally be the market price, however, then
the price charged to Northern for all of its gas under the contract will
rise to the above market price.
Summary of the Case Study of the Northern Contract
In hindsight, it seems that Northern should never have agreed to a
contract with the Beaver Creek producers which contained a third party
most favored nations clause. For various reasons, mostly unanticipated
at the time of the agreement, the contract turned out to be a time bomb.
Upon examination of the commercial and regulatory situation at the time
Northern agreed to the contract, however, Northern appears neither
villainous nor inept.
Still, the results of the contract were very unfavorable to the consumers of Northern's gas. By 1980, when the average United States con8
sumer of natural gas was paying $2.80 per thousand cubic feet, Northern
5 9
were
customers
and
its
itself was paying $2.80 per thousand cubic feet,
especially
were
high
prices
These
more.
presumably paying consideraly
galling to Wyoming residents who knew they were living in a natural gas
producing state.
Unaware of, or perhaps unconcerned with, the commercial and
regulatory background to Northern's actions, these consumers simply
wanted something done about the high price of natural gas. In 1985, the
Wyoming legislators heeded their constituents, and attempted to control
consumer prices of natural gas through legislation.
THE WYOMING NATURAL GAS CONSUMERS' ACT OF

1985

The failure of Northern's judicial challenge, and the unfettered interaction of the third party most favored nations clause with the payment of
above market prices for gas due to the phased in aspect of deregulation,
resulted in Northern and possibly other utilities paying unexpectedly high
prices for natural gas. These excessive costs were then passed on to consumers. The Wyoming legislature responded to the situation by enacting
the Wyoming Natural Gas Consumers' Act of 1985. Essentially, the Act
takes a market-oriented, pro-consumer approach by permitting cities or
townships to bypass the long term contracts of their public utility and
purchase gas directly from suppliers on the open market. Thus, even
though the public utility may be locked into paying above market prices,
the public will not be so constrained if the legislation works as planned.
57. See Pierce, supra note 48, at 96-99. Proposed Federal Energy Regulatory Commission regulations for interstate pipelines would mitigate the distortion caused by the lowcost gas "cushion" by requiring pipelines to bill separately for old and new gas and dedicate
the old gas supplies to historic customers. See Regulation of Natural Gas Pipelines After
Partial Wellhead Decontrol, 50 Fed. Reg. 24130, 42372 (1985) (to be codifed at 18 C.F.R.
§§ 154, 157, 161) (proposed June 7, 1985) (hereinafter cited as FERC proposed rules).
58. 2 ENERGY INFORMATION AD., supra note 19, at 117.
59. Northern, 500 F. Supp. at 634.
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One of the best ways to understand the Wyoming Natural Gas Consumers' Act is to compare the legislation as finally passed with the bill
as originally introduced. Analyzing these changes, it becomes clear that
what started as a statute favoring large corporate buyers of natural gas
was transformed into a more positive piece of legislation for residential
consumers.
Sponsored by Senators Charles Scott and Tom Strook, both of Casper,
the Natural Gas Consumers' Act, Senate File 85, passed through the
Wyoming Senate with few changes. In the House of Representatives,
however, the bill was assigned to the Corporations Committee, and Chairman Patti MacMillan of Laramie led the bill through significant modifications.
The original bill was designed to make natural gas utilities into common carriers, available to any consumer of natural gas. The House amendments changed the whole approach. The House version, which ultimately
became law, allows Wyoming cities and towns, but not individual consumers, to procure natural gas on behalf of their residents and gives them
authority to enter into franchise agreements with utilities to distribute
those supplies at reasonable rates to be set by the Public Service Commission.
The Bill as Introduced
Senate File 85 was introduced to amend Wyoming Statute Section
15-1-103, which defines the general powers of cities and towns.60 This may
seem like an odd place for a natural gas act, but there are two good reasons
for the placement. The first, legal reason is that under this statute,
municipalities in Wyoming are granted the authority to grant franchises
to public utility companies.61 Because the bill aimed to change the rules
for franchising natural gas public utilities, it was logical to put the bill
in this section. The second, political reason is that the idea to alter the
way gas utility companies operate came from the city councils of Casper
and Laramie.61 Since the cities originated the idea, the legislature's first
impulse was to amend the statutes granting cities the power to deal with
public utilities.
The bill introduced by Senators Scott and Strook provided that "upon
renewal or initial grant of a franchise, [the governing body of a city or
town may provide that] the franchisee shall furnish a gas distribution
system through which any supplier, including the franchisee, may sell and
distribute natural gas . . . to any person served by the distribution

system."3 The bill further provided that the distribution system would
have to "accept for delivery to any person served by the system, natural
"64
gas from any supplier.
60. The bill was proposed to amend Wyo. STAT. § 15-1-103(a)(xxxiii) (1977). S. 85, 48th
Wyo. Legis. (1985).
61. WYo. STAT. § 15-1-103(a)(xxxiii) (1977).
62. Interview with Representative Patti MacMillan (May 6, 1985).
63. S. 85, supra note 60, § I(a)(xxxiii)(QC.
64. Id § I(b)(ii).
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The idea was to give consumers a choice. The utility would continue
to provide natural gas to those consumers who wanted to remain
customers of the utility. Other consumers could negotiate their own
natural gas contracts, then pay the utility company to distribute those
private supplies. The utility would act as a common carrier, available to
all who wished to use its facilities.
Consumers were always free to purchase their own natural gas from
the producers. But a supply of natural gas is almost useless without a
pipeline to transport it and some method of distributing it to the consumer.
The franchised utility companies owned the distribution facilities, and they
were not willing to let just anyone use them. Only the largest industrial
users had the bargaining power to enter voluntary carriage contracts with
pipeline or distribution companies,6 5 and even the large purchasers could
not force a utility or other distributor to transport its gas if that entity
did not care to do so.
Under the original Senate File 85, this would have changed. The franchised public utility companies would not have been able to carry their
own gas exclusively. Instead, as common carriers, the utility companies
would have to accept, carry, and distribute the gas of anyone requesting
them to do so. As with all common carriers, the distributors would be
on equal terms and would
obligated to accept all applicants for service
66
have to charge uniform rates to all users.

The theory behind the bill was that if natural gas users, in addition
to the utility companies, could effectively enter the natural gas market
and bid for their own supplies, consumers could negotiate lower prices
for their natural gas. Senator Stroock, one of the sponsors of the legislation, commented that his bill created a "free market system, and explained
that there will be no interference from the state. '67 This system would
lower prices for those consumers with the initiative and the resources to
negotiate their own contracts.
The Bill as Changed by the House CorporationsCommittee
When the bill reached the House of Representatives, there was strong
criticism of the scheme. In a hearing conducted by the House Corporations Committee, several people testified to shortcomings in the bill.68
Under the leadership of committee Chairman Patti MacMillan, the bill
"insure [that it is] workable and protects consumers in
was rewritten' '6to,
9
the long run.

65. At least one large industrial gas user, Wycon Chemical Company of Cheyenne, was
already purchasing its own gas supplies and had made a voluntary contract with Northern
to transport the gas. New Mexico's Natural Gas Rules Similar to Wyoming's Proposals,
Casper Star Tribune, February 8, 1985, at A12, col. 2.

66. Compare N.Y. TRANSP. CORP. LAW, § 90 (McKinney 1943).
67. Senate Approves Gas FranchiseBil Laramie Boomerang, January 30, 1985 at 1,
col. 4.
68. Natural Gas Bill Opposed, Laramie Boomerang, February 9, 1985 at 1, col. 2.
69. MacMillan: Gas Bill Needs Work, Laramie Boomerang, February 13, 1985, at 1,
col. 4.
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The major change in the bill allowed cites rather than consumers to
purchase natural gas and have it distributed. The Committee amended
the bill so that
[a]ny city or town or its authorized representative shall act as an
agent for any person served by the system in negotiating terms
and conditions for the supply of natural gas to that person, and
the franchisee distribution system shall accept for delivery to any
person served by the system, natural gas from any supplier.7 1
Representative MacMillan explained that the reason for this change
was concern for consumers. "We wanted to protect the average consumer.
We felt that you and I and Mrs. Johnson down the street simply lacked
the time, resources, and sophistication to deal effectively in the natural
gas market," she commented later. "How would you like to telephone
Amoco and ask to negotiate a natural gas purchase contract? I'm sure
I couldn't even do as well as Northern has." 7' As Representative Peg
Shreve noted, "experts have warned that allowing individual consumers
to negotiate contracts would be an administrative nightmare. "72
To further protect residential consumers, the House committee made
several smaller changes. The Committee clarified that the transportation
rates to be charged by the distribution company would be regulated by
the State Public Service Commission, and should "reflect the reasonable
nongas costs ... plus a reasonable return on investment. ' 7 3
Representative MacMillan also commented that the committee
members felt the average consumer would not be able to deal with the
safety and welfare aspects of natural gas, and in particular with the need
to secure an adequate and dependable supply. The Committee did not want
any consumer to be without gas through one of Wyoming's cold winters."'
To ensure safety and convenience, the Committee provided that the
Public Service Commission, not the gas distributor, should designate
where the system would accept the natural gas into the system.7 The Committee also provided that a proposed supplier of natural gas to a city has
the burden of proving to the Public Service Commission that the seller
could supply adequate and deliverable reserves, and increased the required
reserve from five years' supply to ten.7 ' Finally, to protect consumers from
any adverse effects of lower quality gas or distribution systems, the Committee added a provision that any supplier entering the system "is liable
70. Enrolled Act 70, ch. 172, 1985 Wyo. Sess. Laws § 1.
71. MacMillan interview, supra note 62.
72. House Gives Initial OK to Gas Bill, Laramie Boomerang, February 19, 1985, at
8, col. 1.
73. Enrolled Act 70, Ch. 172 1985 Wyo. Sess. Laws § 1(b)(ii). Compare S. 85, supranote
60, § l(b)(i).
74. MacMillan interview, supra note 62.
75. Enrolled Act 70, ch. 172, 1985 Wyo. Sess. Laws § 1(b)(iii). Compare Senate File S.
85, supra note 60, § l(b)(iii).
76. Enrolled Act 70, ch. 172, 1985 Wyo. Sess. Laws § l(b)(vi). Compare Senate File S.
85, supra note 60, § l(b)(v).
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due to failure of the supplier to

exercise that standard of care which a reasonable, prudent person would
exercise under the same or similar circumstances .... ""
In another move to help lower consumer prices, the committee inserted
a provision giving the Public Service Commission authority to decide
which gas a pipeline should ship. If a pipeline or distributor has insufficient capacity to accept all the gas it is requested to carry, the Commission may require it "to accept gas that has a lower price to the consumer
in preference to higher price gas.""8 Under this provision, it is conceivable
that a utility company would be unable to ship its own gas,79and instead
would have to accept the natural gas purchased by a city.
After it provided that cities could purchase gas on behalf of consumers,
the Committee was concerned that consumers might have no voice in
deciding whether to choose the utilities' gas or the supply procured by
the city. 0 The Committee therefore added a provision that the city must
hold a special election on the question and get the approval of a majority
of those voting before it forces the utility to carry gas.8 '
In addition to the above amendments designed to protect the safety
and welfare of consumers, the Committee added a sunset provision. Unless
the legislature re-enacts it, the direct purchasing portion of the Act will
expire in 1988.82 According to Representative MacMillan, if the experiment does not work, it will simply die quietly. 3 But if the experiment
will be forced
works fairly well, with only minor problems, the legislature
8 4
to reconsider the bill and make the necessary changes.
The Legislative Debate
After making these changes, the Corporations Committee reported
the bill out to the House of Representatives. The bill eventually passed
the House, and was approved by the Senate as well. The legislation was
not received without criticism, however, and some of the negative comments on the bill are instructive.
One of the sponsors of the original bill, Senator Strook, became a vocal
opponent of the new veision. Repeating the theme of unregulated free
enterprise, Senator Strook said, "I wonder if the city is capable of
77. Enrolled Act 70, ch. 172, 1985 Wyo. Sess. Laws § 1(b)(xi).
78. Enrolled Act 70, ch. 172, 1985 Wyo. Sess. Laws § l(b)(vii).
79. Amended Version of Gas Bill Makes It out of House Committee, Casper Star Tribune,
February 14, 1985, at Al, col. 1 [hereinafter cited as Amended Version]. As discussed later
in this article, the fact that most public utilities are subject to the constraints of "take or
pay" clauses in their long term purchase contracts means they may have to pay for some
gas that they will not have the capacity to distribute under this legislatively authorized
scheme. See infra text accompanying notes 95-96.
80. MacMillan interview, supra note 62.
81. Enrolled Act 70, ch. 172, 1985 Wyo. Sess. Laws § 1(a)(xxxiii)(C).
82. Enrolled Act 70, ch. 172, 1985 Wyo. Sess. Laws § 3. No sunset applies to the provision of the Act prohibiting indefinite price escalation clauses in public utility contracts that
cause intrastate gas prices to rise above the market price. Id.
83. MacMillan interview, supra note 62.
84. MacMillan interview, supra note 62.
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negotiating as good a deal as the private citizen-private enterprisewould do." 85 Others shared Senator Strook's concern that the cities and
towns of Wyoming really might not have the expertise and experience
to negotiate favorable natural gas contracts. 6 These critics emphasized
that Northern had not acted foolishly in accepting the contract it did, and
that cities may have a difficult time doing any better. Some legislators
said that cities will be tempted to take advantage of the current abundant supply of natural gas and make favorable short term contracts. These
people feared that in the future, when gas supplies again run short, the
cities will be unable to contract for new supplies. Utility companies' contracts, by that time, will have expired or been broken or renegotiated, and
the cities' consumers will be left without natural gas supplies."7
The supporters of the bill replied that cities are indeed sophisticated
players in the natural gas market. The cities of Casper and Laramie, for
example, have attained some expertise in the area, and both have hired
private consultants to assist them in natural gas problems. Furthermore,
as Representative MacMillan pointed out, the new version of the bill requires that suppliers show at least ten years of reserve supply. The Public
Service Commission requires utility companies to show the same ten year
reserve, she noted, so the cities will be in no worse condition than the
utilities if a shortage develops."'
A more common criticism was that the bill simply would not accomplish its goal of lowering gas prices for consumers. Representative
Ken Burns, otherwise known for his pro-consumer stands, warned, "The
city of Casper, [or] Laramie, is not going to save one cent by these bills.
If anything, prices will be higher.''89
The reasons for Burns' objection are derived from the peculiarities
of rate regulation for natural monopolies such as natural gas distributors.
Gas pipeline and distribution companies make large initial investments
in laying the pipelines. Once the lines are in place, however, marginal costs
are low, because the cost of serving one more consumer is very small. In
a competitive industry, the equilibrium price is normally set at marginal
cost. In the regulated monopoly of natural gas distribution, however, utility rates are regulated to provide a recovery of these fixed costs, not just
to cover the marginal cost of serving each customer. 90
Representative Burns was concerned that the large firms would convince the cities to purchase gas for them, and not for residential consumers.
The firms would then negotiate to pay only the marginal costs of trans85. Amended Version, supra note 79 at A12, col. 1.
86. House Gives Initial Ok To Gas Bil, supra note 72, at 8, col. 2. (This statement was

attributed to Representative Sorenson).
87. Interview with Representative Cynthia Lummis, (May 7,1985.) Lummis stated that
although she did not necessarily share these particular views, they were commonly expressed
among legislators.
88. MacMillan interview, supra note 62.
89. Amended Version, supra note 79, at A12, col. 2.
90. See generally T. MORGAN, J. HARRISON & P. VERKULL, ECONOMIC REGULATION OF
BUSINESS, CASES AND MATERIALS, 15-17 (2d ed. 1985).
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porting their gas, while the remaining customers would bear an increased
the end, conburden of compensating the utility for its fixed costs. In
1
costs.
utilities'
the
of
share
sumers would pay a larger
To this argument, Representative MacMillan responded that, under
the amended bill, the Public Service Commission would set the rates the
utilities received for transporting gas. The rates would reflect not only
the direct costs of transporting the gas, but also a fair share of the return
on investment. All those using the pipeline, whether industrial or residential consumers, would still pay a share of the utilities' return92 on investment, and no great cost shift to the consumer would occur.
The supervisor of the state Oil and Gas Commission, Don Basko,
voiced another concern. Nearby wells drawing from the same reservoir
often have differently priced gas. If the Public Service Commission uses
its authority under the Act to require utilities to carry the lower priced
93
gas first, one well could have its production drained off by another well.
The legislation states, however, that the Commission must act consistently with the Wyoming "ratable take" statute, which prohibits discrimina-4
tion by purchasers among producers drawing from the same gas pool.
Representative Cynthia Lummis opposed the legislation for two
reasons. First, it seemed unlikely that any city would be able to use the
bill. Consultations with the director of the Public Service Commission convinced her that most of Wyoming's natural gas is already committed to
other long term contracts. "There may be very little gas available for the
cities to purchase," she said. Another reason the cities may be unable to
use the bill effectively was that the language of the legislation was vague
and hard to understand. These ambiguities were also the second major
reason she opposed the bill. "The language of the bill is so confusing that
it is sure to generate litigation," she stated. Not only will the litigation
be a strain on the judicial system, but also the cities may find themselves
buried in legal fees. In the end, she feared, any city that tries this experiment may end up costing its citizens far more in legal expenses than they
could ever save on utility bills. 5
Many questions are left unanswered by the legislation. For example,
existing natural gas purchase contracts commonly contain take or pay
clauses, under which the purchaser agrees to pay for a given amount of
gas whether or not it actually takes that gas. If a city purchases its own
supply and makes the utility company distribute that gas, the utility may
be unable to use all the gas it previously contracted to buy. But if the
utility has a take or pay clause in its contract, it must pay for that gas
whether it takes it or not. The bill does not address what would happen
91. Amended Version, supra note 79, at A12, col. 2.
92. MacMillan interview, supra note 62. See also, House Gives InitialOk To Gas Bil
supra note 72, at A12, col. 2.
93. Amended Version, supra note 79, at A12, col. 2.
94. Enrolled Act 70, ch. 172, 1985 Wyo. Sess. Laws § 1(b)(vii); WYo. STAT. § 30-5-125
(1983).
95. Lummis interview, supra note 87.
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in this situation. If these extra costs are passed on to consumers in another
city served by the utility, those consumers will be faced with even higher
natural gas prices. If the utility has no other cities to absorb the costs,
it may be forced to bear significant losses or perhaps even go out of
business. In such a corporate life or death situation, the utility may not
wish to agree to a franchise that would force it to distribute gas purchased
by the city, and nothing in the legislation requires any public utility to
sign a franchise agreement.
Representative MacMillan conceded that the bill did not address every
problem. As to the take or pay problem, she said that most supporters
of the bill simply assumed that such contracts also contained force majeure clauses 6 and if government action rendered the utilities unable to
take a required amount, the take or pay clause would not be enforced. 7
This outcome is not guaranteed, however. Even if the utilities' contracts
do contain force majeure clauses, there is sure to be litigation over whether
or not the cities' purchasing of natural gas is the sort of major force which
will excuse performance of the take or pay clauses."'
Summary of Wyoming's Natural Gas Consumers' Act
While the Natural Gas Consumers' Act has some unresolved problems,
on balance it is a worthwhile attempt to lower consumers' natural gas bills.
The House Corporations Committee was certainly correct that the vast
majority of individual consumers would not want to negotiate individual
supply contracts nor would they have the necessary experience, expertise, and resources. Allowing cities and towns to negotiate supply contracts on behalf of consumers is a good compromise. The legislation as
passed neither forces consumers to negotiate their own contracts nor
leaves them obligated indirectly under unfavorable contracts accepted by
the gas utility companies.
The House Committee is to be commended for its attention to protecting the average consumer. They showed faith that cities have the ability to negotiate natural gas contracts but they also made sure the legislation would adequately protect the public safety and welfare. With the provisions for consumer protection that eventually appeared in the legislation, it seems unlikely that the consumers of Wyoming will be faced with
any real disaster.
It remains to be seen, however, if the Natural Gas Consumers' Act
will provide any relief to the natural gas users. In theory, the scheme could
lower natural gas prices.
96. "Force majeure" means superior force. In contract law, force majeure clauses are
intended to excuse the promisor from performance in the event that performance becomes
impossible due to causes beyond the control of the parties. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 581
(5th ed. 1979).
97. MacMillan interview, supra note 62.
98. FERC has recently promulgated new regulations to permit interstate pipelines more
leeway to buy out take or pay clauses in their long term purchase contracts. 50 Fed. Reg.
42408 (1985) (to be codified as 18 C.F.R. § 2.76-77). Also, most long term purchase contracts
entered into since the late 1970's already contain such "market out" clauses.
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FUTURE PROSPECTS FOR THE NATURAL GAS CONSUMERS' ACT

The Wyoming legislature has launched an experiment in controlling
natural gas prices. Because the approach is new, any attempt to predict
the affects of the legislation is speculative. Still, it is interesting to consider whether any city will put the Natural Gas Consumers' Act to use,
and whether the outcome will be lower prices for Wyoming natural gas
users.
Comparison With Other States
No other state can provide much guidance for Wyoming's experiment,
because no other state has tried this particular method. New Mexico, New
York, and West Virginia have tried similar but not identical plans, and
their approaches provide some insight into the Wyoming legislation. Other
states have simply prohibited indefinite price escalation clauses in public
utility contracts on a retroactive basis.
In 1984, New Mexico passed legislation that is similar in effect to the
Wyoming Natural Gas Consumers' Act. The New Mexico statute requires
by
natural gas pipelines and utilities to transport natural gas purchased
99 Unlike
carriers.
common
be
to
any buyer, in essence declaring pipelines
Wyoming's act, the New Mexico law is not limited to cities and towns.
In another statute, however, the New Mexico Energy and Minerals
Department is directed to "advise with and negotiate the purchase of
natural gas for political subdivisions of the state ... or purchase natural

gas and resell it to them at a price which will produce a reasonable return"
to the state.100 In combination, these statutes would apparently allow the
same sort of city purchasing program as the Wyoming law.
Unfortunately, the New Mexico experience does not offer much empirical data for Wyoming. For several reasons, no city in New Mexico has
used the law to procure its own gas supply and have it delivered. First,
while the New Mexico law took effect in July, 1984, the Public Service
Commission did not promulgate the rules to put the program into effect
until December of that year. 10 1 Second, the New Mexico law had a sunset
provision, under which it expired in June, 1985, and the legislature made
no mention of what would happen if a city were forcing a pipeline to deliver
gas when the law expired. Cities may have been reluctant to enter gas
supply contracts only to find themselves with no way to transport and
distribute the gas when the law was no longer effective. New Mexico apparently did not re-enact the law in 1985.102
Wyoming may have learned one useful lesson from the New Mexico
statutes, however. The Wyoming legislature also wrote a sunset provision into its act, and the law will expire in 1988. But the Wyoming
99. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 62-7-18 (1984).
100. Id § 71-2-6.

101. Telephone interview with Jean Peters, New Mexico Legislative Council Service (Sept.

18, 1985).
102. Id.
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lawmakers provided that "repeal of these provisions does not affect any
franchise agreement made pursuant to these provisions prior to the effective date of their repeal."'' 0 3 Given this extra bit of security, Wyoming

cities may be more willing to try the experiment than New Mexico cities
have been.
A New York statute provides that natural gas pipeline corporations
are common carriers. Under New York law, "[a]ll persons desiring to
transport products shall have the right on equal terms to transportation
in the order of application, on complying with the reasonable regulations
and charges of such corporation." 0 4 West Virginia has also declared that

gas utility pipelines are common carriers.105 Unlike Wyoming's legislation,
neither of these two statutes deals specifically with cities and towns. West
Virginia's law took effect only in 1983, while New York seems to have
considered gas pipelines as common carriers since the turn of the century.
But if cities in either state have used the laws to combat high gas prices,
the fact has not been widely publicized.
The Wyoming Act, in addition to setting up the direct purchase
scheme, also outlaws the type of indefinite price escalation clause that
was the subject of the Northern litigation. 0 6 Other states, including
Kansas'07 and Oklahoma, 0 8 have declared that similar price escalation
clauses in contracts entered into before 1977 may not be used to raise
the price of intrastate gas to a level higher than what would be permitted
under the NGPA for interstate gas of the same vintage. The Kansas law
was upheld in the United States Supreme Court against a challenge that
it violated the parties' constitutionally guaranteed freedom to contract. 0 9
When price escalation clauses are banned retroactively, the utilities may
be able to renegotiate their long term contracts, taking into account the
changed circumstances of the current deregulated market."10 With this
approach, lower prices to the utility could result, which should in turn
be passed on to residential customers.'
The Wyoming statute, unlike the Kansas and Oklahoma laws, does
not specify that the ban is applicable to contracts in effect before the
103. Enrolled Act 70, ch. 172, 1985 Wyo. Sess. Laws § 3.
104. N.Y. TRANSP. CORP. LAW, § 90 (McKinney 1943).
105. W. VA. CODE § 24-3-3a (1984 Supp.).
106. WYo. STAT. § 15-1-103(c) (Supp. 1985).
107. Kansas Natural Gas Price Protection Act, KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 55-1401 to -1415
(1983).
108. Oklahoma Natural Gas Price Protection Act, OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, §§ 260.1-.13 (1981).
109. See Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 416-17
(1983). In dictum, the majority stated that since Kansas had a "significant and legitimate"
interest in protecting consumers from the escalation of natural gas prices caused by deregulation, the parties had not been deprived of their constitutional right to contract.
110. Legislative proposals currently under consideration in the United States Congress
would also restrict the effects of indefinite price escalation clauses in interstate gas contracts.
See Ringleb, The Natural Gas Regulatory Dilemma: A Market Solution, Another Complex
Compromise, or the Status Quo?, 6 J. ENERGY L. & POL'Y 107, 142-44 (1985).
111. The savings to Oklahoma consumers as a result of their legislation has been estimated
at $1.1 billion. See Comment, Legislative Impairment of Natural Gas Contracts: Energy
Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 19 TULSA L.J. 384, 402 (1984).
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112. WYo.

STAT.

§ 15-1-103(c) (Supp. 1985J.

113. Id. § 15-1-103(a)(xxxiii)(C).

114. MacMillan interview, supra note 62.
115. Id.
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116. See WYo. STAT. § 15-1-103(a)(xxxiii)(C) (Supp.
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Casper and Laramie have been the leaders in the effort to do something
about natural gas prices. It seems likely that either Casper or Laramie
will be the first to try the new system.
Oddly enough, at first Northern itself seemed to be antagonizing these
cities, almost encouraging them to implement the experiment. On April
27, 1985, the newspapers of both Casper and Laramie reported that Northern had petitioned the Public Service Commission for another rate increase.
The Laramie Boomerang reported that the price hike "would increase
Laramie's residential natural gas rates from $4.80 per Mcf to $5.30 per
Mcf ....1"I17 The front page headline of the CasperStar Tribune proclaimed,
"Gas Prices to Soar if Hike OK'd.""' 8
One day later, on April 28, the Wyoming Association of Municipalities
hosted a meeting in Casper to help cities "learn how they can lower the
cost of natural gas by implementing legislation passed this year."11 9 The
newspaper report of the meeting indicated that the cities felt confident
about their ability to do so.
The signs indicate, then, that a Wyoming city may well attempt to
use the Natural Gas Consumers' Act in the near future. Casper and
Laramie voters have already authorized their city councils to pursue this
option in special elections held August 20, 1985.120 Both are already
soliciting bids from natural gas suppliers."'
Possible Outcomes Under the Act
There are three possibile outcomes for the first city to implement its
own natural gas purchasing program. First, the city could negotiate
favorable supply contracts, and convince the voters to approve the plan.
Under a new franchise agreement, the utility company would transport
and distribute the city's gas to residents. In this success story, the city
would actually bring down natural gas prices.
Another, less positive, outcome is also possible. Even if a city does
negotiate a favorable gas supply contract, there are enough ambiguities
in the new legislation that an uncooperative utility could entangle the city
in endless litigation over the details of the plan. The city residents could
end up paying more in legal fees than they save in gas prices. Even this
scenario is not too discouraging. Once the first city clears a path through
the legal jungle, the cities to follow would have an easier time implementing the program. While the first city might pay a high price for the success of the others, in the end the Wyoming experiment would prove to
be a success.
117. Northern Asks 50 Cents per Mcf Laramie Boomerang, April 27, 1985, at 1,col. 1.
118. Gas Prices To Soar If Hike Ok'd Casper Star Tribune, April 27, 1985, at Al, col. 1.
119. MunicipalitiesLearn Steps to Lower-Cost Gas, Casper Star Tribune, April 28, 1985,
at Al, col. 5.
120. Laramie Voters Back Gas Supply Option, Laramie Boomerang, Aug. 21, 1985, at
1, col. 4; Gas Supply ProposalsApproved, Laramie Bomerang, Aug. 22, 1985, at 1, col. 6.
121. Gas Bids Opened, Laramie Boomerang, July 4, 1985, at 1, col. 5; City Considers
Switch to CIG Gas, Laramie Boomerang, May 24, 1985, at 1, col. 2.
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A third possibility is that the cities will be unable to negotiate contracts any better than Northern's. This is perhaps the most serious situation, for it would show that the Natural Gas Consumer's Act is merely
a noble experiment that failed. In the end, no one would benefit under
this scenario.
Using the Act to Gain Concessions
Even if no Wyoming city ever fully implements the new program, the
Natural Gas Consumers' Act may still prove useful in controlling gas
prices. As noted earlier, both Casper and Laramie will soon consider renewing Northern's franchises to serve those cities, and the voters have approved the quest for another supplier. Even without actually purchasing
gas from another company, however, Casper and Laramie may be able
to use their new authority to force Northern to make some concessions.
Northern in effect was trapped into paying excessive prices by a series
of events and conditions beyond its control. If Northern is now faced with
the possibility of losing a large part of its market for gas because cities
will be purchasing their supplies elsewhere, Northern may be able to impress upon its own suppliers the seriousness of the situation. The Wyoming Act prohibits the use of indefinite price escalation clauses, so that
if read to apply to contracts already in existence, Northern may well be
in a good position to renegotiate more favorable terms with its suppliers.
These savings could be passed along to consumers, especially if there is
a real threat that Northern might be undercut by other suppliers if it does
not find a way to lower its price. It is therefore possible that the Natural
Gas Consumers' Act could help lower gas prices even if no city actually
uses its provisions to bypass the local utility.
Indeed, in a recent negotiated settlement between Northern, the
Wyoming Public Service Commission and eleven Wyoming communities
which had intervened in Northern's rate case, the utility agreed to a rate
cut of 25 cents per MCF to affected consumers. Northern was reportedly
able to reduce rates to consumers because it had in turn negotiated a price
cut on the natural gas purchased from one of its major suppliers, Amoco.,"
It may well be that the threat of cities purchasing their own gas supplies
provided the bargaining chip nessary to gain this concession.
Representative MacMillan agreed that this is one of her hopes for the
legislation. "I believe we gave the consumers and the cities more clout,"
she said. In an appropriate summary of the Natural Gas Consumers' Act,
she stated, "it may prove to have its problems, but I think they are
solvable. One way or another, this bill seems likely to help the consumers. 123

122. Settlement Will Trim Gas Rate, Laramie Boomerang, Sept. 19, 1985, at 1, col. 5.
123. MacMillan interview, supra note 62.
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